Governance Process
Last updated
Last updated
Before any official proposal is made, proposers can open a temperature check thread to share their ideas and discuss them in the . This step helps voters better understand proposals and encourages active governance participation. Anyone can initiate a temperature check discussion.
AI Enhancement: AI-driven analytics can summarize discussion threads, highlight key points, and assess community sentiment to provide data-driven insights for voters. This allows for better engagement and ensures proposal improvements before moving to a formal vote.
Once the temperature check has facilitated a healthy discussion, a formal snapshot proposal and forum proposal thread can be created.
The DAO proposal is then formally submitted. Initially, only whitelisted veYND holders with at least 500,000 veYND can initiate formal proposals. Interested parties can analyze proposed changes, hold discussions, and gather support.
Once a proposal has been created, token holders vote via the YieldNest DAO platform, built in collaboration with Aragon. The voting period lasts 7 days but will be extended by 3 days if a quorum is reached right before the deadline, ensuring fair participation.
Once a DAO proposal has passed, a 3-day waiting period is initiated. Users who object to the outcome can withdraw funds or make necessary adjustments during this time. After the waiting period, the YieldNest multi-sig executes the proposal, or work begins if it’s not an on-chain action.
Incentive allocations are voted on monthly through a weighted vote, where the percentage of votes received determines the share of incentives allocated to different initiatives. This system mimics the CRV bribing model, but instead of discretionary rewards, incentives are distributed to all eligible users to ensure long-term alignment.
veYND holders vote on where to allocate YND incentives, with options including:
MAX LRTs
LRT Strategies
Integrations such as LP pools
This process requires a list of potential allocation targets, which could lead to vote markets where participants bribe veYND holders for votes.
The Security Council comprises nine members, requiring a 5-of-9 majority for emergency action. Members are elected every six months via an on-chain vote.
The Security Council is responsible for mitigating critical risks and can take emergency action without a vote if required. These emergency actions include addressing:
Critical security vulnerabilities that could endanger user funds
Threats to protocol integrity
